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1. Introduction
Banking supervision has become more difficult in the course of internationali-
zation, financial innovation and concentration in the banking industry. Particu-
larly the bigger, internationally active banks are financially, legally, and organi-
zationally complex institutions. Timely identification of problems at individual 
banks and of disequilibria building up in the banking system has become a 
daunting task.
A crucial factor in these developments is the market. Markets play an ambig-
uous role. On the one hand, financial markets are a driving force behind the 
increasing complexity of banks: They offer an unprecedented choice of sophis-
ticated instruments to manage, diversify, but also to conceal risks. On the other 
hand, markets may facilitate the tasks of supervisors in two ways. First, markets 
exert direct market discipline: Risky banks may find it difficult or expensive to 
refinance. Second, for bank supervisors market data may be a source of indirect 
discipline: The terms at which banks borrow may reveal to supervisors valuable 
information on investors’ perception of bank quality.
Indeed, it is well known that markets process and aggregate information avail-
able to investors. H (1945), in his classic article, defines a society’s main 
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economic problem as aggregating “the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess” (p. 519). And 
he goes on to claim that “this problem can be solved, and in fact is being solved, 
by the price system” (p. 525). Hayek’s vision has inspired the modern hypothesis 
of informationally efficient markets, which claims that all available information 
is reflected in market prices.
If the efficient markets hypothesis is true, observed yields on bank debt and 
equity reflect the available information on the probability distribution of bank 
returns. Such market data may not be free of noise, but they are likely to convey 
valuable signals on bank quality and risk. The reason is that “market partici-
pants have an incentive to look through reported accounting figures to the real 
financial condition of a bank and to price a bank’s securities based on their best 
estimates of the distribution of the security’s future cash-flows” (E and 
W, 2001, p. 122).
Several studies have examined the information content of market data on 
bank risk. The international evidence suggests that market signals are indeed 
informative, especially for banks in industrialized countries. Most evidence exists 
on the US (see F, 1998, for an overview of the early literature and 
K and L, 2001; S and W, 2002; C, E and 
F, 2003; F, H, R and T, 2003 for more recent 
research). Recent contributions treat European banks (P, 2002; S, 
2003; G, V and V, 2006) or Japanese banks (B, G, 
H and K, 2003).1 Some researchers (see, e.g., B, D 
and F, 2000; E and W, 2001; G, L and 
M, 2001; C and Q, 2005) find that market data are 
not only informative, but that they also contain information which is not yet 
part of confidential supervisors’ information. At the same time, market data do 
not reflect all information available to supervisors.2 In other words, this branch 
of the literature suggests that supervisory information and market information 
are complementary sources of bank supervisory intelligence.
Market prices have been used or proposed as a source of information in differ-
ent contexts as well. Presidential betting markets like the electronic market run 
by the University of Iowa have performed very well as predictors of presidential 
1 Market signals appear to be less informative in emerging countries, though. See, e.g., B, 
L and M (2002) or S (2002).
2 This suggests that markets may be informationally efficient in the so-called semi-strong sense 
(reflecting all publicly available information) but not necessarily in the strong sense (also 
reflecting private information available, for instance, to supervisors).
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elections (R and S, 2004), of the number of books sold on the first 
day of a Harry Potter release or of the regional incidence of flu (‘flu-tures’).3 
Several internet betting sites quote a number of contracts predicting events from 
sports and politics; the Hollywood stock exchange predicts the success of movies 
and movie stars, including awards. In July 2003, the US Department of Defense 
disclosed a plan to introduce a market for political events. It was argued that 
“markets are extremely efficient, effective and timely aggregators of dispersed 
and even hidden information” (Pentagon Prepares a Futures Market on Terror 
Attacks, New York Times, July 29, 2003). Prices of individual contracts would 
thus reflect the probabilities of the respective event. The idea of trading in ‘ter-
rorist futures’, as critics put it, met with political and moral concerns and was 
abandoned (for details see W and Z, 2004).
Bank supervisors and central banks do not have to create markets first, before 
deriving information from prices. Market information in the form of data on 
the yields of bank equity and subordinated debt is available for many banks in 
a number of countries (B C  B S, 2003).4 
Central banks and supervisory authorities are thus confronted with the question: 
Should observed market prices be taken into account for policy decisions in the 
area of banking and systemic stability, and, if yes, to what degree and how? One 
possible if somewhat vague answer was given by the former Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan: “Significant changes in a banking organiza-
tion’s debt spreads, in absolute terms or compared with peer banks, can prompt 
more intensive monitoring of the institution” (G, 2001).5
While supervisors in most countries do not rely much on market information, 
the issue is on the table.6 Some economists even advocate the use of market data, 
particularly in the form of subordinated debt spreads, as automatic triggers for 
supervisory action (see, for instance, C, 1999; for an overview of vari-
ous subordinated debt proposals see B  G   F 
3 Predicting Influenza, The Economist, October 19, 2005, p. 84.
4 Banks that issued subordinated debt represent more than 50 percent of banking assets in the 
Basel Committee member countries.
5 Chairman Greenspan knew that markets can be wrong. The day his nomination was announced, 
bond markets had their biggest one-day drop in five years (After Alan, The Economist, October 
19, 2005, p. 49).
6 A workshop held at the Bank of England in April 2003 made it clear that several supervisors 
and central banks were interested in the use of bank specific market information, and that 
research projects were under way in a number of institutions, including the Swiss National 
Bank. At the same time, with the given state of knowledge, supervisory authorities seem hesi-
tant to tie any specific action to developments in market prices.
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R S, 1999). The supervisory community has taken a cautious and 
fairly pragmatic stance. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has not 
issued any official statements on the use of market information specific to banks. 
However, its new minimum capital recommendations for banks (‘Basel II’) rely 
on market discipline as the third of three pillars (B C  B-
 S, 2005). Increased bank transparency is thought to strengthen 
direct market discipline by investors; in addition, a pricing of bank debt and 
equity that better reflects risk might also provide better information for national 
supervisory discipline under the second of the three pillars (national implemen-
tation of first pillar capital requirements).
In the absence of international recommendations and practical experience, 
national authorities have little guidance on how to deal with market data spe-
cific to banks in their supervisory and system stability approaches. In Switzer-
land, the question is particularly relevant, given the country’s highly developed 
and internationalized banking system. As responsibilities are shared, there are 
several potential beneficiaries of market information.
Responsibility for supervising the solvency of individual banks lies with the 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC). Within the Swiss indirect or two-
stage supervision process, the SFBC traditionally satisfies its data needs from 
external auditors’ reports. In addition, the SFBC collects some data directly, par-
ticularly from the two big banks, UBS and Credit Suisse Group (CSG). Hence, to 
the SFBC, market data might flag problems not recognized by external auditors 
or by its own indicators and within rather selective on-site examinations. Exter-
nal auditors themselves might get hints for their work from market prices.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) is the lender of last resort to the banking 
system and has an explicit mandate to contribute to systemic stability. Its inter-
nal database is oriented towards monetary policy, rather than to solvency issues. 
Access to the SFBC’s information is restricted for privacy reasons. Therefore, 
market data could give the SNB early warning signals not available from other 
sources.
Finally, there is a private collective deposit insurance scheme run by the Swiss 
Bankers Association (SBA). The banking community organized in the SBA is 
thus interested in the solvency of its individual members, but it has no means 
to supervise them. Even for the banks, market information may thus be used as 
a makeshift.
In the present paper we examine the suitability of market data for the assess-
ment of banking and systemic risk by Swiss authorities. In particular we try to 
close two gaps in the literature: We present and interpret the (limited) empiri-
cal evidence on market data as solvency and risk indicators for Swiss banks and 
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we discuss the information economic issues raised by a possible use of such data 
for policy purposes. We find that some important aspects have been largely 
neglected in previous discussions. This is particularly true for the endogeneity 
problem discussed in 5.2.3.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we look at market 
prices for passive use, i.e., as a pure source of information. In other words, we dis-
cuss the informational content of market prices from a theoretical point of view 
(section 2), we evaluate potential indicators for bank solvency and risk (section 3) 
and we examine the availability and quality of the relevant data in Switzerland 
(section 4). Then, we look at market data for active use, i.e., as a basis for super-
visory action. In particular, we discuss options for the practical use of market 
data and the complications arising in such a context (section 5). Finally we draw 
conclusions regarding the future use of market prices by authorities (section 6).
2. The Information Content of Market Prices
In order to assess data requirements or the quality of available market data, we 
need a benchmark against which to assess the properties of actual data. The rel-
evant benchmark depends on the intended use of market data. In the present 
section we assume that the supervisor wants to use market data passively, i.e., 
purely as an additional source of information.
To understand market prices, we need to know how they are generated. First, 
investors receive or collect relevant information. Second, the market aggregates 
individual information into prices. The quality of market data as a mirror of fun-
damentals thus depends on the accuracy or quality of information as well as on 
the efficiency of the price mechanism.7
2.1 The Quality of Information
The quality of individual information is often identified with the accuracy or 
precision of signals individuals get about the true value of uncertain economic 
variables. It reflects a number of different factors. Investors get their information 
from a variety of sources including banks’ publications, interviews with bank 
representatives, analysts’ or raters’ views, the media, rumours, etc. As far as banks’ 
7 Information acquisition by individuals is not completely differentiated from information aggre-
gation in the markets, since observations on prices and quantities of trades may feed back into 
the information acquired by individuals.
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publications are concerned, disclosure requirements may improve information 
quality, and so may the presence of specialized rating agencies. Yet, informational 
quality is also endogenous in the sense that it depends on investors’ own efforts 
to gather information. Such efforts depend on the cost of obtaining information 
(again, disclosure may help) and on the benefits of having it; insured depositors, 
for instance, may not care about the solvency of their bank.
2.2 The Efficiency of the Market Mechanism
The extent to which observed asset prices reflect investors’ information is nor-
mally called the informational efficiency of markets. Markets are information-
ally efficient (in a theoretical sense) if market participants take the same deci-
sions after observing prices as they would have done had they actually possessed 
all existing information (B, 2001).8 Prices then constitute a ‘suffi-
cient statistic’ for all available information, absolutely in accordance with Hayek’s 
vision. Informational market efficiency is composed of several elements:
a Market Completeness
 Market completeness in simple terms means that there is at least one asset for 
each potential state of nature (for a more precise definition, see L, 
2004). Information about the probability of that state can then flow into each 
individual price. Incomplete markets cannot absorb all the information in an 
economy. In practice, there are several reasons for market incompleteness. The 
cost of operating some markets may prevent the issue or the trading of the 
securities in question. Some states of nature may not be verifiable. A practi-
cal example is the non-existence of a contract on the insolvency of a bank that 
enjoys a ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantee (see 4.3).9
b Strong-form Efficiency of Individual Prices (no Profit Opportunities)
 Efficiency of prices or of markets as used in the empirical literature is different 
from informational market efficiency in the theoretical sense. It is normally 
understood as the absence of systematic profit opportunities.10 The relevant 
8 The empirical concept of informational market efficiency (strong, semi-strong, weak) often 
used in the finance literature differs from the theoretical concept of informational efficiency 
(see below).
9 Although the bank may become insolvent, it will never actually default. This makes insol-
vency a non-verifiable state on which no contracts can be written.
10 Note that under market incompleteness, markets can be efficient in the empirical sense (leav-
ing no profit opportunities) without being informationally efficient in the theoretical sense 
(reflecting all information).
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notion here is the strong-form efficiency of prices; indirect market discipline 
can be expected to be most effective when even private information is fully 
reflected in prices. Note, however, that in a strong-form efficient market, 
prices also reflect expected supervisory actions. They thus give supervisors no 
indication on the fundamentals, such as the probability of bank failure in the 
absence of supervisory intervention. In this sense, supervisors would ideally 
prefer markets to be ‘almost’ efficient (see 5.2.3).
c Irrelevance of Higher-order Uncertainty
 A third feature of informationally efficient markets (in the theoretical sense) 
is that prices reflect information about fundamentals, but not beliefs about 
beliefs. When investors have reason to bet on average market opinion, rather 
than on the best information available to them, there is a wedge between the 
observed price and the fundamental value of an asset.11 The observed price 
may then not reflect the information that really interests supervisors.
d Absence of Noise in the Data
 Noise is the difference between observed price and the price consistent with 
individuals’ information. It varies over time. Such a difference can arise due 
to frictions in the microstructure of markets.12 The relative size of this noise, 
the noise-to-signal-ratio, depends mostly on the liquidity of markets. Market 
liquidity is commonly defined as the ability of a security to be promptly con-
verted into cash, without any price discount. Clearly, for securities that are 
liquid and frequently traded, a large amount of information flows into prices 
and keeps the difference between the (last) observed price and the informa-
tionally correct price small.
2.3 Practical Criteria for Data Quality
In practice, neither the quality of individual information nor the informational 
efficiency of markets is perfect. Supervisors looking for information in the mar-
kets therefore need a list of priorities for data quality as well as an understanding 
of what they can and what they cannot know from market data.
11 This phenomenon arises in the presence of irrationality, but also from interactions between 
public and private signals (M and S, 2002).
12 Examples of these frictions are physical handling costs or taxes, risk bearing costs (risk-averse 
liquidity suppliers), asymmetric information, the strategic behavior of financial intermediar-
ies, borrowing constraints or other short-term concerns leading some informed traders not to 
bet unlimited amounts on their information; see O’H (1995).
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The quality of individual information (the first part of the link between fun-
damentals and market prices; see 2.1) is not directly observable. Although super-
visors can never take its accuracy for granted, they may try to improve investors’ 
information, for instance by setting disclosure requirements. Hence, a first prac-
tical criterion for information quality is the transparency of the issuing bank.
The efficiency of the market mechanism (the second part of the link between 
fundamentals and market prices; see 2.2) has, in practice, stronger and weaker 
components.
a Market completeness in the strict sense is not necessary for a reasonable assess-
ment of banks’ probability of failure. No supervisor needs a price reflecting 
the probability that a bank will become insolvent on a particular day, say, five 
years from now. A number of securities with sufficiently phased maturities 
will therefore give a reasonable time-profile of market expectations. Market 
incompleteness becomes critical, though, if contingencies relevant for super-
visors are not priced. A case in point is state guarantee for banks. Under state 
guarantee, the price of bank debt reflects the probability that either the bank 
or the state will repay the debt. The probability of the bank becoming insol-
vent is not separately priced.
b Empirical market efficiency (absence of profit opportunities) is well approxi-
mated in reality. It has been confirmed (only in its semi-strong form, though) 
by a large number of empirical studies for a wide range of markets, even though 
some violations have been found (S, 2000). Still, empirical market 
efficiency is likely to increase with the presence of a sufficient number of pro-
fessional, highly skilled market participants who buy, hold, or sell a particular 
security. With respect to large and complex banking organizations, especially, 
the ability of investors to map signals (bank disclosures) into fundamentals 
(bank risk) is no trivial matter nowadays.
c Trading on fundamentals or the irrelevance of higher-order uncertainty is a 
critical issue, however. Since beliefs are not observable, supervisors cannot dis-
tinguish changes in market prices that are driven by changes in fundamentals 
from mere speculation by average opinion on changes in average opinion, or 
from irrational exuberance (S, 2000). A recent example of a deviation 
of market prices from fundamental values is the internet bubble that burst in 
2000. Clearly, some securities are more susceptible to bubbles than others.
d The absence of noise in prices, or a low noise-to-signal-ratio, is another criti-
cal link between information and prices, as there are remarkable differences 
between banks. Thus, frequency of trading and liquidity, which both reduce 
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the noise-to-signal-ratio, will be used as important criteria in assessing the 
quality of available market indicators (see 3 and 4).
In what follows we will thus focus on the criteria of data quality summarized 
in Table 1.
Table 1: Criteria for Market Data Quality
Criterion Rationale
Market completeness Are there a sufficient number of risk-sensitive securities for a bank? Do 
they reflect investors’ perceptions of state contingencies that are rele-
vant to supervisors? 
Information quality How transparent is the issuing bank? Is there a sufficient percentage of 
highly skilled investors with access to information? 
Trade on fundamentals Do investors focus on fundamentals or are there indications that prices 
are driven by opinions about opinions? 
Noise-to-signal-ratio Are markets sufficiently continuous and liquid? Does noise make the 
information extraction unfeasible? 
3. Solvency and Risk Indicators
In this section we describe the different solvency and risk indicators that can be 
found on the financial markets. We present, so to say, the ‘buffet’ from which 
supervisors interested in market indicators may help themselves. Such indicators 
can be classified according to their underlying ‘target’ – either a single institution 
or the whole banking/financial system – and according to the asset on which 
they are based – equity, debt, or other instruments.
Each indicator has its own characteristics and focuses on specific aspects of 
bank risk profiles. Although different indicators for the same bank appear to be 
complementary in nature, their functional relations in providing information 
have not been explored in great detail. We will therefore focus on individual 
indicators and their specific strengths and weaknesses.
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3.1 Individual Bank Solvency
3.1.1 Equity
With respect to information extraction purposes the main advantage of equity 
markets lies in their high liquidity and participation rates. While bonds or options 
are typically traded among institutional investors like hedge funds, pension funds 
or assurances, an increasing number of smaller private savers directly invest in 
the stock market. One the one hand, this may broaden the informational basis 
of stock prices; on the other, the risk of herd behavior may increase. Yet, the basic 
problem associated with equity-based indicators is related to the fact that share-
holders are potential beneficiaries of substantially positive outcomes but are pro-
tected by limited liability in the case of a severe downturn. Because of this non-
linear payoff profile they may have an excessive appetite for risk (D 
and T, 1994). Hence absolute equity prices and returns may give ambigu-
ous signals about the soundness of a bank. For example, the stock price of an 
almost insolvent bank is expected to rise if its managers enter an extremely risky 
‘game for resurrection’ with negative present value. In addition, one can argue 
that shares are more susceptible to bubbles than other securities due to their 
unlimited upward potential and infinite maturity.
Regulators as well as investors are aware of these issues and have therefore tried 
to refine equity-based indicators. The most widespread approach builds on the 
idea that equity can be seen as an option on the bank’s assets (M, 1974). 
By means of modern option pricing theory one can then calculate the implied 
market value of the assets and their implied volatility from observed share prices 
and bank balance sheet data. An indicator of default – the ‘distance to default’ – 
is then derived by comparing market net worth to the standard deviation of the 
fluctuations in asset value.13 Distance to default is available with relatively high 
frequency, but it is also very sensitive to assumptions regarding the (unknown) 
underlying distribution of the value of assets. In general, while the absolute values 
of the distance to default are difficult to interpret, relative changes over time and 
comparisons across banks may give a useful signal about the market opinion on 
a particular institution.
Today, Moody’s KMV, a financial service company specialized in modeling 
default risk, uses a more elaborated version of the Merton structural model to 
13 Technically, the distance to default is defined as the following expression (the level of the 
default point usually being determined by the book value of the liabilities): 
 [market value of assets – default point]/[market value of assets*asset volatility].
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estimate a measure of default probability for various corporations around the 
world.14 Although the KMV model can be easily applied to banks and similar 
institutions, the results appear less encouraging than in other sectors. Banks 
have a balance sheet structure that is very different from other firms and more 
complex. The possibility of government bailout of banks may further distort the 
results, although this problem may affect equity less than other instruments.
3.1.2 Debt
Some supervisors consider subordinated debt spreads15 as the best market indica-
tor currently available. Bond markets are relatively deep and established markets, 
and prices can be observed on a relatively frequent basis. Moreover, bondholders, 
unlike shareholders, are exclusively concerned with the downside potential of a 
bank. Hence their concerns and objectives align with those of the supervisor. 
Subordinated debt holders are the most vulnerable of all bank creditors, including 
senior debt holders and depositors, as their claims are the first to absorb losses. 
For these reasons, they have the strongest incentive to monitor bank activities. 
The majority of the proposals aimed at improving market discipline thus advocate 
the mandatory issue of subordinated debt and/or some upper limit to acceptable 
yield spreads.16 Such a policy would face a certain choice between different forms 
of subordinated bank debt – long or short term; debt with put or call options – 
as these also differ with regard to their information content (F, H, 
R and T, 2003).
However, debt based indicators also have their drawbacks. First, empirical evi-
dence indicates that bond spread movements have a significant systematic com-
ponent.17 In other words, common factors like the interest rate structure or the 
risk attitude of investors may influence spreads more than changes in the idiosyn-
cratic risk profile of the reference institution. This complicates the interpretation 
of spread movements. In order to detect idiosyncratic risk changes, comparisons 
over time and across banks may be useful. Second, the subordinated debt yield 
does not directly measure risk perceptions of the sophisticated investors who hold 
14 In particular, KMV maps the distance to default into a probability of default using an empiri-
cal distribution based on historical data. See C and B (2002) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the KMV methodology.
15 The debt spread or – more precisely – the debt yield spread is defined as the difference in yield 
between different types of debt obligations. The spread is usually calculated for a risk free 
security, so as to reflect what the market charges as premium for potential default.
16 See B  G   F R S (1999) for an overview.
17 See, e.g., E, G, A and M (2001).
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such debt, but it also reacts to changes in risk attitudes or perceptions of a wider 
public (B and H, 2003). Third, in special cases bond spreads 
may inherit the specific problem of standard equity based indicators, i.e., when 
a bank is insolvent, even debt holders may benefit from an increase in the risk of 
bank assets. In such a situation, a narrowing spread may signal a deterioration 
and not an improvement in the risk profile of that bank. Finally, bond liquid-
ity is often quite poor, especially in secondary markets, and therefore liquidity 
premiums must be taken into account when comparing spreads (H and 
K, 2001; E and W, 2002).18
For this latter reason researchers and regulators usually suggest that spreads be 
calculated on the basis of issue prices (S, 2001). The weakness of primary 
market data, however, is their limited availability, especially for those banks that 
issue infrequently. At the same time, the decision to issue debt has some infor-
mational content per se, which is embedded in primary market data (B 
and H, 2003). Thus, information on a bank’s risk and return profiles is 
present not only in prices but also in quantities. For traded instruments, quan-
tities appear to be less risk-sensitive than prices (D-K and H-
, 2004). For banks that have few traded instruments outstanding, or none 
at all, quantities (e.g. amount of uninsured deposits) may, however, provide some 
information (B and M, 2002).
3.1.3 Derivatives
A derivative is a financial contract whose value is affected by the value of other 
underlying variables. Derivatives normally come in the more traditional shape 
of options on shares or bonds, or in the more recent form of credit derivatives. 
While, in general, the number and variety of financial securities has increased 
over the last decades, the market for derivatives has experienced a veritable boom. 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimates that the global over-the-
counter derivatives market had underlying assets of 285 trillion USD at the end 
of 2005, compared to 95 trillion in 2000.19
Credit derivatives are probably the fastest growing component of this market. 
In the context of risk analysis, the main advantage of credit derivatives lies in 
the fact that they reflect very specific risks. For example, it is relatively straight-
forward to extract accurate information about the solvency of a borrower from a 
18 However, a part of the difference between the observed price and the fundamental value may 
be averaged away if there are several bonds and noise is bond specific.
19 See B  I S (2006).
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Figure 1: Senior CDS vs Senior Bond Spread of UBS
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Figure 2: Senior CDS vs Senior Bond Spread of Credit Suisse Group
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credit default option or swap (CDS). For that reason CDSs are becoming increas-
ingly popular as a source of information for supervisors. A CDS is an agreement 
between two parties, A and B, in which A makes B a fixed periodic payment 
while B pays A a floating fee that depends on whether a specific credit event relat-
ing to a predetermined asset has occurred or not. In other words, a CDS trades 
exclusively credit risks, and its price is less influenced by other factors than are 
bond spreads. Moreover, credit derivatives are often more liquid and less noisy 
than the related spot asset (see Figures 1 and 2). The International Swaps and 
Derivative Association (ISDA) estimated that the total volume of CDS outstand-
ing reached about USD 26 trillion in June 2006, having doubled annually in 
the previous five years.
3.1.4 Ratings
Information on bank risk does not always need to be extracted from prices or 
quantities. International agencies like Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s (S&P’s) 
specialize in assessing the default risk of a particular institution or security and 
making the results public in the form of ratings. Public credit ratings are hybrid 
indicators: They are publicly observable like market prices, but they do not 
result from a trading process. Since rating agencies normally have access to con-
fidential files of the companies they review, their ratings may indeed represent 
a useful source of information to supervisors (B C  B 
S, 2000). In addition, the direct revelation of the information has 
the advantage of disclosing the rationale behind each rating action to supervi-
sors (see 5.2.1).
The ‘standard’ long term credit ratings have been refined in various ways. The 
Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs) and the FitchIBCA Individ-
ual Ratings (FIIs), for instance, are intended to reflect the soundness of a bank 
without taking credit support from other parties into account. Therefore, BFSRs 
and FIIs can be especially useful for state owned institutions or for banks that 
may be considered ‘too-big-to-fail’ (see 4.3).
One drawback is that rating adjustments often lag the changes in the risk pro-
file of the reference company and therefore can be hardly used as early warning 
indicators. Some rating agencies also explicitly attempt to rate firms ‘through 
the cycle’, thus avoiding rating changes due to cyclical changes in firm solvency 
(B C  B S, 2000). This may suppress some 
valuable information on short-term default risk and actual ratings.
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3.2 Systemic Risk Indicators
Instead of focusing on a single bank, we can of course use market data to assess the 
soundness of the whole financial system. The most straightforward way to obtain 
systemic risk indicators is to aggregate the above measures over bank groups or 
sectors. There are also some indices (e.g. the Swiss Performance Index, SPI, has 
a subindex containing only bank shares) and wide-ranging securities available in 
the market, for which the standard indicators can be directly calculated.
In addition, some researchers have recently developed more complex measures 
of system risk based (also) on market data. The index of financial stress for Canada 
(I and L, 2003), for instance, represents an attempt to develop a composite 
measure aimed at predicting banking crises. Information about financial stress is 
extracted exclusively from market data and elaborated, using several techniques. 
Four markets are included in the computation: banking, foreign exchange, debt 
and equity. According to its authors, this index outperforms other financial stress 
measures in identifying periods of tension for the Canadian financial system.
Yet, there seems to be scope for some aggregate measures of systemic pressure, 
modeled on the Bank of Canada’s stress index but also incorporating non-finan-
cial price-based information. In particular, the inclusion of real economic data or 
bank balance sheet data (current figures plus forecasts) might further improve the 
accuracy of predicting crises. The Swiss National Bank (SNB), within its man-
date to oversee systemic stability, has recently developed a stress index based on 
a broader set of data (S N B, 2006; H and M, 
2004, 2005).20 This index appears to do a good job in detecting periods of stress 
for Switzerland (see 4.4).
In a systemic context, market information can be useful also for exploring 
other more specific issues. By analyzing bank contagion in Europe, G, L 
D and V (2006) show how equity market prices can be used to identify 
systemically important banks within and across countries. In particular, their 
indicator helps to detect foreign banks and markets which domestic supervisors 
should monitor closely because of their close link to the home bank sector. The 
work of Gropp, Lo Duca and Vesala builds on the Merton model, in that they 
analyze the correlation and causality structure of extreme shocks affecting the 
distance to default for a sample of banks.
20 The index combines market data (stock and bond prices), accounting data (interbank depos-
its, bank profitability, bank capital, bank provisioning rate), supervisory information (number 
and size of institutions on the regulator’s watchlist) and structural features of the Swiss bank-
ing system. Macroeconomic indicators are used as proxies for some of the above variables in 
order to forecast the index.
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4. The Availability and Quality of Market Data in Switzerland
In the present section we will examine whether market data are available in suf-
ficient quality for the Swiss banking system. Above (2.3) we have defined data 
quality as: the availability of securities (with different maturities) that reflect 
banks’ perceived risk profiles; the transparency of the issuing bank or investors’ 
skill and access to information; the dominance of fundamentals over higher-order 
beliefs in the market; the continuity of trading and the liquidity of markets.
4.1 Availability
In Switzerland, market data are available for a minority of banks; however, these 
banks constitute a major part of the banking system (see Table 2). For the two big 
banks, in particular, data quality is high, since both UBS and CSG have issued 
numerous financial instruments for which the market is quite liquid. Market 
data quality for smaller banks – in particular regional banks and some cantonal 
banks – is usually inferior, given lower trading volume and investors’ interest. 
The vast majority of Swiss institutions have neither a financial rating nor any 
outstanding traded securities. Indeed, the data sets for subordinated debt and for 
equity are small. By the end of 2006, only 7 Swiss banks had quoted subordinated 
debt outstanding and only 25 banks were listed on a stock exchange. Yet, these 
banks accounted for 80 percent respectively 84 percent of the total assets of the 
banking system. Moreover, driven by consolidation of the Swiss banking sector 
during the real estate crisis of the 90s and the strong growth of big banks’ inter-
national operations, the ratio of total assets of banks active in financial markets 
to total assets of the banking system grew steadily throughout the last decade. 
As a result, there seem to be sufficient market data for an assessment of systemic 
stability in the Swiss banking sector.21
In the future, the importance of market-based funding is likely to increase, 
also for smaller institutions. In recent years, many medium-sized and small-sized 
banks have experienced a reduction in retail-based funding resources (such as sav-
ings accounts). Several of them are trying to gain access to the capital markets in 
order to find the funds needed for their business. Due to their modest size, most 
of these institutions have had to intensify the collaboration within the respective 
bank groups in order to gain efficient access to the capital markets. The Raiffeisen 
21 For this reason, the Swiss National Bank also uses the principal market indicators described 
in the text as inputs (among others) when assessing the stability of the banking system.
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Table 2: Summary of the Availability and on the Quality of Market Indicators in Switzerland
End of 2006 % of Available indicatorsa
Debt Equity CDS Ratings (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch)
Liquidity and 
data quality Other issuesb
Senior Subordi-
nated
Long term 
credit
Financial 
strength
Big banks
banks 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
high TBTF
assets 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Cantonal banks
banks 71% 13% 46% – 42% 8%
mixed
state 
guaranteeassets 94% 20% 50% – 73% 33%
Regional banksc
banks 3% 1% 6% – 1% –
medium/ low  
assets 25% 20% 50% – 19% –
Raiffeisen Group 
banks 100% – – – 100% 100%
medium  
assets 100% – – – 100% 100%
Other banks
banks 2% – 3% – 4% 2%
medium/ low  
assets 16% – 12% – 32% 14%
All banksd
banks 8% 2% 8% 1% 7% 3%
  
assets 90% 80% 84% 78% 90% 85%
a Security traded on an exchange and/or easily observable data.
b Expectations of external support; see 4.3.
c Without Clientis, which is an umbrella organization, rather than a bank in the strict sense.
d Big banks consolidated. Percentages slightly biased due to double counting of some subsidiaries of UBS and Credit Suisse Group.
Source: SNB
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banks are grouped within the Raiffeisen Group, which supports its members on 
various issues including market-based funding. The smallest regional banks are 
also trying to set up similar ‘umbrella organizations’. An example is the Clientis 
Group, an umbrella organization for about 30 institutions. Up to now, those con-
glomerates have operated almost exclusively in the traditional bond market and 
in the Pfandbrief market. Market data would thus become available for aggregate 
groups of smaller banks, rather than for individual banks themselves.
4.2 Peculiarities of Available Data and Indicators
The main problem with debt-based indicators is that few Swiss banks actually 
borrow on the capital market more than two times per year. Because of this 
modest borrowing activity, one has to rely on a panel of secondary bond market 
data for calculating bond spreads. However, in general, the Swiss secondary debt 
market is relatively illiquid. A big share of debt is purchased by institutional inves-
tors, who often hold those securities until maturity. For some bonds (especially 
those issued by small banks) there may be no trading for several weeks and indic-
ative prices set by the market makers may not be very informative.
Liquidity problems are less pronounced for equity-based indicators. This sug-
gests the estimation of default probabilities by means of the KMV method. 
Indeed, the calculation of the distance to default for all quoted Swiss banks is 
relatively unproblematic. Yet, the mapping of the distance to default into a prob-
ability of insolvency turns out to be more challenging: The functional form of 
this relationship is, a priori, unknown and is very difficult to estimate empiri-
cally, as the number of bank defaults in Switzerland is extremely small.
Credit and financial strength ratings are of course an additional important 
source of information on Swiss banks. Unfortunately, only few domestic institu-
tions are currently rated by the principal international agencies.22 Yet, demand for 
information on the solvency of debt issuers is increasing, as bond investors also 
become more risk sensitive. This may boost the number of banks willing to be 
rated. Moreover, given that not every debtor can (or wants to) afford a Moody’s 
or S&P’s rating, some banks – e.g. Credit Suisse and the Zürcher Kantonalbank 
(ZKB) – are publishing rating guides on a larger number of Swiss issuers. One 
limitation of those handbooks is that their authors do not have access to the con-
fidential records of individual borrowers.
22 Moody’s: 9 banks; S&P’s: 12 banks; Fitch: 4 banks (excluding subsidiaries of Swiss bank hold-
ing companies and branches of foreign banks).
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Finally, few Swiss banks are treated as reference obligor in CDSs or in other 
similar transactions. Only for the two big banks are instruments offered, but 
further research is needed in order to assess the availability and utility of these 
data.
4.3 The Role of Explicit or Implicit Guarantees
The particular structure of the Swiss banking sector may reduce the information 
content of market prices. First, the two big banks, UBS and CSG, hold assets 
representing more than 75 percent of aggregate assets of all domestic banks, or 
almost eight times annual Swiss GDP. Because of their systemic relevance, inves-
tors may speculate that the two big banks could be ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF). If 
investors believe that a troubled TBTF-bank will always be bailed out by the 
government, perceived risk will be small and market discipline ineffective. How-
ever, looking at the size of UBS and CSG in relation to the domestic economy 
and the resources of the Swiss public sector, one may wonder if these banks are 
also ‘too-big-to-be-rescued’, which would partially offset the distorting effect of 
the TBTF-problem.23 Second, many of the Swiss banks active in financial mar-
kets are cantonal banks. These institutions are protected by state guarantee, in 
some cases only implicitly or to a limited extent,24 which may again make market 
indicators less revealing.
4.4 Empirical Evidence on Information Quality
Empirical evidence on the quality of market indicators for Swiss banks or for 
the whole national financial system is still very limited. B and M-
 (2002) find that, in the absence of market prices, quantities of uninsured 
deposits have predictive power for bank solvency. An empirical analysis of debt 
spreads (F, 2007) provides mixed evidence on information quality. 
Debenture yields react to changes in the risk profile of (non state-owned) banks, 
but they do not appear to be very valuable to supervisors as early warning indica-
tors. Thus, the market does not appear to have more timely information about 
23 At the end of 2004, total assets at UBS amounted to about CHF 2,173 billion, or to almost 
five times Swiss annual GDP.
24 For the Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (BCV), the guarantee is implicit, while for the Banque 
Cantonale de Genève (BCGe), there is an explicit guarantee but it is limited. For the other 
banks the cantons explicitly guarantee all the liabilities except, in some cases, subordinated 
debt.
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individual institutions than the SFBC. However, this conclusion is based on the 
(questionable) assumption that the SFBC does not use market information in 
its supervisory process.
Even by looking at the raw data, however, some interesting facts emerge. First, 
as already stated, a very good market data set exists for the most systemically 
important banks, UBS and CSG. Moreover, even if there is some evidence on 
the presence of a TBTF-effect (R, 2005), this bias does not seem to com-
pletely destroy the information content of the indicators. Consider for example 
subordinated bond spreads (see Figure 3): If investors were certain that the two 
big banks are ‘too-big-to-fail’, they would not require any return premium for 
default risk. Yet, in October 2002, CSG bonds traded with an average premium 
of 240 basis points over a comparable government bond and with a premium of 
almost 150 basis points over bonds issued by UBS. Such large price discounts 
would have been arbitraged away in the absence of default risk.
Figure 3: Subordinated Debt Spreads of UBS and Credit Suisse Group
Average over all exchange-traded subordinated bonds satisfying the following conditions: 
fixed coupons, no options, denominated in Swiss franc, residual term of at least two years. 
End of month.
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On the other hand, the state guarantee appears to limit the usefulness of market 
indicators for most cantonal banks, as shown by Figures 4 and 5. Only for 
the Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (BCV) and the Banque Cantonale de Genève 
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(BCGe) – the two cantonal banks that do not enjoy a full state guarantee – do 
yield spreads on senior debt appear to indicate problems. Around 2002, their 
spread curves exhibit peaks not present in the flat curve for a bank such as the 
Zürcher Kantonalbank. Unfortunately, the BCV and the BCGe happen to be 
the only two cantonal banks that have in fact had problems in the period under 
consideration. Observed spreads thus seem consistent with two interpretations: 
Either, state guarantee for cantonal banks is discounted by investors, or the lim-
itations of the state guarantee for the two banks are credible, at least to some 
degree.
Even though the two banks eventually received injections of fresh capital by 
their respective cantons, we find the latter hypothesis more plausible. First, the 
BCV and the BCGe traded with a premium over the other cantonal banks even 
before the problems became apparent. Secondly, the debt yields of cantonal 
banks (with the exception of the BCV and the BCGe) move very strongly in 
tandem. This suggests that, for these borrowers, bond prices are mainly influ-
enced by systematic risk factors and only marginally by the default probabilities 
of the individual banks. This is also confirmed by empirical analysis (F-
, 2007).25 There is one final small piece of evidence in favor of investors’ 
confidence in state guarantee (up to the individual canton’s financial limits): The 
Solothurner Kantonalbank, a fully guaranteed cantonal bank with outstand-
ing traded debt failed in 1996 (i.e., prior to the period under consideration).26 
Within the five years preceding the failure, the bank’s senior debt spreads rose 
from 0.5 percent to only around one percent, thus providing rather faint signals 
of the bank’s weakness.
In the presence of state guarantee, Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
or FitchIBCA Individual Ratings, which abstract from potential third party sup-
port, could be extremely useful. Unfortunately, among cantonal banks, such a 
rating is currently available only for the St. Galler Kantonalbank and the Zürcher 
Kantonalbank (both from Moody’s). Another way to lessen the problem of the 
state guarantee and thereby enhance market discipline would be to limit the scope 
25 Evidence on the distorting effects of government guarantees can be also found abroad. F-
 and S (1996) show that US bank investors became risk aware only when the reg-
ulator made it clear that they were not protected in the event of default. According to S 
(2003), issue spreads on subordinated debt of European public sector banks are, ceteris pari-
bus, less risk-sensitive and about 40 basis points lower than spreads of European private banks. 
S (2002) and P (2006) argue that, due to state guarantees, the average European and 
Japanese bank bond trades at a lower spread than its North American counterpart.
26 The canton subsidized the takeover of the Solothurner Kantonalbank by SBC, one of the (then 
three) big banks.
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Figure 4: Senior Debt Spreads of Selected Cantonal Banks
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Figure 5: Senior Debt Spreads of Selected Cantonal Banks
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Both Figures: Average over all exchange-traded senior bonds satisfying the following conditions: 
fixed coupons, no options, denominated in Swiss franc, residual term of at least two years. End 
of month.
Source: Datastream
Can Bank Supervisors Rely on Market Data? 
of the protection. At some cantonal banks,27 for instance, subordinated debt is 
currently not guaranteed by the canton. Yet, not surprisingly, only one of these 
banks has issued publicly traded subordinated securities.
As already stated above, the quality of market data tends to be negatively cor-
related with bank size. Most small banks have few financial securities outstand-
ing – usually only equity or a few senior bonds – and these securities are barely 
traded. As illustrated in Figure 6, the bond issued by the Banque Cantonale du 
Jura (total assets: CHF 2 billion) exhibits almost no price fluctuation five years 
after issue, an indication that virtually no trading takes place. By contrast, the 
price of a comparable security issued by the Zürcher Kantonalbank (total assets: 
CHF 93 billion) changes every few days.
Figure 6: Price Fluctuations of Selected Cantonal Bank Bonds
Daily bond prices (last trade at the SWX exchange).
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Finally, empirical evidence on the Swiss National Bank stress index (S 
N B, 2006, p. 44) developed by H and M (2004, 
2005) is consistent with the fact that a good set of market data (when combined 
with non-market data) is available for the Swiss banking system. Indeed, the 
27 Glarus, Graubünden, Nidwalden, St. Gallen, Zurich.
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index correctly identifies the four most stressful periods for the Swiss banking 
system since the 1980s (see Figure 7): (1) the aftermath of the stock market crash 
in 1987, (2) the consolidation phase following the real estate crisis of the early 
1990s, (3) the Russian crisis and the collapse of LTCM (Long Term Capital Man-
agement) in 1998, as well as (4) the bursting of the internet bubble after 2000.
Figure 7: The SNB-Stress Index
In standard deviations from the 1987–2006 average.
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The information content of market data and other information (including super-
visory information) can be assessed from a decomposition of the aggregate stress 
index into the two components ‘Market’ and ‘Other’. As Figure 8 illustrates, the 
two sub-indices moved fairly well in parallel during the two most recent periods 
of stress. In 1991, market data gave an early indicator of the upcoming crises, even 
though the crisis mainly affected banks without outstanding instruments traded 
on a regular basis. After the 1987 stock market crash, market data jumped to 
stress levels without any concomitant deterioration of non-market data. This may 
look like a false alarm. Yet, the market line may well indicate what would have 
happened, ceteris paribus, for instance without the reaction by the authorities. 
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Indeed, after the stock market crash, the Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy 
was quite expansionary,28 which kept systemic stress factors at bay. This may be 
an example where markets did not anticipate the policy response and thus did not 
incorporate it in prices (see 2.2 and 5.2.3). By contrast, the ‘Market’ component 
of the index largely failed to signal the existence of the internet bubble before it 
burst in 2000. In this period, prices may have reflected beliefs about (optimistic) 
beliefs of other investors, rather than economic fundamentals.
Figure 8: The Market and the Non-market Component of the SNB-Stress Index
In standard deviations from the 1987–2006 average.
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Figure 8, far from providing an empirical test, is thus an illustration of the com-
plementary character of market and other information as well as their complex 
relationship. Carefully interpreted, market sensitive measures of systemic pres-
sure, like the SNB stress index, are likely to be superior to measures that do not 
include any price-based information or include only price-based information.
28 In 1988, three factors contributed to loose monetary policy: (1) the introduction of Swiss 
Interbank Clearing (SIC), (2) new (lower) cash liquidity requirements for banks, and (3) the 
SNB’s desire to keep interest rates low after the stock market crash.
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4.5 General Assessment
Our criteria for data quality are best met by indicators for the big banks. There 
is a sufficient basket of securities reflecting big banks’ risk profiles; these securi-
ties are regularly traded in liquid markets, and with the participation of skilled 
investors. The evidence suggests that market data signal most problems. Poten-
tial reservations reflect periods of positive or negative bubbles (when beliefs may 
occasionally prevail over fundamental facts) and ‘too-big-to-fail’ expectations 
which may somewhat distort – but not invalidate – market indicators.
The majority of cantonal banks have fewer debt instruments outstanding, and 
markets are less liquid. The state guarantee may limit the quality of debt indi-
cators; yet, in the two major recent problem cases (at banks with limited state 
guarantee) bond spreads did flag the problems.
While market data appear sufficient to give a true picture of financial condi-
tions for a small number of Swiss banks only, these banks actually represent the 
major part of the banking system. Systemic stability indicators, particularly if 
they combine market and non-market data, provide valuable information. How-
ever, their market component alone may fail to flag problems during stock market 
bubbles and may give false alarms during downturns.
Empirical evidence from Switzerland – consistent with the evidence from other 
countries –suggests that, read with some caution, market data contain valuable 
information on the risk profile of a particular bank or the banking system. Com-
bining supervisory information with market data thus yields a more accurate pic-
ture of individual and systemic stability.
5. The Practical Use of Market Data by Bank Supervisors
Supervision, as a practical exercise, is oriented towards action. The question thus 
arises: What should supervisors do with information provided by the market? In 
what follows, we highlight some issues that arise when supervisors use market 
data for policy intervention.
5.1 Defining a Role for Market Data
An agency intending to use market information in an active way is confronted 
with the question: What is the optimal link between market data and policy 
action? Generally speaking, such an ‘intervention function’ F can be written 
as:
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 I = F(M,P,S,d), (1)
where I denotes the vector of actions taken by the agency as a function of a vector 
of market data M, a vector of other public information like accounting data P, a 
vector of private supervisory information S, and a discretionary term, d. Market 
data, M, and other public information, P, are publicly observable. Supervisory 
information, S, is not publicly observable. The discretionary term d cannot be 
specified in advance. It stands as a residual summing up all unforeseen influ-
ences to which the agency could react.
The intervention function thus specifies how market and other information 
interact in supervisory decisions, as well as the degree of supervisory discretion. 
Two examples may illustrate the range of possibilities. The ‘Calomiris proposal’ 
(C, 1999) stands for the rule-oriented end of the spectrum. In its sim-
plest form, it aims at an intervention function that has only M as an argument. 
Indeed, M would have only one element: the subordinated debt spread. Were 
this spread to hit a threshold, it would trigger the closure of the respective bank. 
The ‘action space’ would thus have two elements only: laissez-faire and closure.
The other example, marking the discretion-based end of the spectrum, is the 
Greenspan suggestion (G, 2001) quoted above. It simply states that 
significant changes in a banking organization’s debt spreads could prompt more 
intensive monitoring. It has a role for all information: market, public non-market, 
and supervisory. Apart from more intense monitoring, no action is specified, thus 
allowing almost full discretion. More intensive monitoring may not even be read 
as an action, but rather as an attempt to improve the quality of supervisory infor-
mation, i.e., of one of the arguments in the intervention function.
Between the Calomiris proposal and the Greenspan suggestion there is a whole 
range of possibilities. At present, most authorities in industrial countries use 
market prices cautiously and with a lot of discretion (see footnote 6). However, 
some agencies may apply some explicit rules in selected areas. The following 
examples illustrate some possibilities; they are not intended to be either exhaus-
tive or normative:
– Special audits or management reports to a supervisor could become due 
automatically if the share price based distance to default falls below a given 
limit.
– Under the second pillar (national implementation) of 'Basel II', a national 
authority, for instance, could require an add-on to a bank’s regulatory capital 
or an equity issue, if the bank’s debt spread exceeds given thresholds.
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– A central bank, as part of its function as lender of last resort could react to a 
deterioration in a bank’s market data in two ways: It could initiate prepara-
tory measures and/or it could become more cautious in lending decisions and 
collateral valuation.
– Deposit insurance premiums could be tied to market data.
These are examples of potential ways in which market indicators could be inte-
grated within a supervisory framework. They are listed here for the purpose of 
illustration. Any attempt to weigh the benefits of the individual options against 
their drawbacks is beyond the scope of this paper. There are, however, criti-
cal issues in the practical use of market data, irrespective of individual options. 
Supervisors who use market data as a basis for action should be aware of the fol-
lowing limitations and problems.
5.1 The Limitations of Market Prices as Policy Guides
5.1.1 Prices Do not Provide Reasons
As mentioned in 2.2, market efficiency means that prices reflect all available 
information. However, it does not imply, that prices reveal that information. As 
Hayek put it, the market is useful precisely because market participants do not 
need to know why a good or a security has become more or less valuable, but 
only by how much.
Revealing prices would mean that we could work back from observed prices to 
all the information that went into prices. In theory, such reverse engineering is 
possible under strong assumptions; in practice it is not.29 Consequently, supervi-
sors cannot read from an increase in a bank’s debt spread whether the manage-
ment is bad or the credit portfolio weak, whether there is fraud in a trading room 
or an imminent international debt crisis that would hit this particular bank. Such 
information might be important, however, for locating the problem and choos-
ing the right supervisory intervention.
One way to mitigate the problem would be to interpret bank specific market 
prices in the light of other market information. Such information includes inter-
views with market participants or bank credit ratings. Note that, unlike the price 
mechanism, rating agencies usually do outline the ‘why’, i.e., the rationale behind 
each rating action.
29 For the conditions under which, theoretically, prices reveal the underlying information see 
B (2001, p. 25).
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5.1.2 Markets Do not Price Policy Alternatives
A related point is that, by their very nature, market data cannot tell the supervi-
sor ‘what to’ do (again, ratings may be an exception since they clarify the source 
of a problem). At any point in time, there is only one set of market prices. These 
reflect what average market opinion expects to happen. There are no alternative 
sets of market prices that reflect optional worlds. Thus, at best, the price system 
provides supervisors with a snapshot picture of market expectations, but it cannot 
be used as a flight simulator showing the impact of alternative policy decisions.
While market prices may flag the existence of a problem, they say little about 
its cause and nothing about what could be done. If an increase in a bank’s debt 
spreads should lead to a “more intensive monitoring of the institution” (G-
, 2001), it remains to be explored how such monitoring could obtain any 
further guidance from market data.
5.1.3 The Endogeneity Problem
Some further complications arise from the fact that market prices do not reflect 
economic reality net of supervisory action. Like any other event, expected super-
visory or governmental actions are included in prices if markets are efficient. 
Prices thus are endogenous to supervisory actions. A nice empirical example is 
documented by DY, F, L and S (2001): The authors 
find that bond spreads of financially troubled banks tend to decrease after an 
unexpectedly poor outcome of an on-site examination. They argue that, after a 
bad examination, markets anticipate a tougher supervisory stance. The authors 
conclude that “the anticipated regulatory response frequently dominates the infor-
mation’s implications about current bank conditions” (p. 902). This effect has not 
really been highlighted by the advocates of using market prices for supervision; 
in the context of currency crises it is briefly mentioned by S (2002).
In the other direction, supervisors may, in the spirit of the present section, 
react to prices. Some economists have even proposed an explicit and mechanical 
link between market data and supervisory action (see, for instance, C, 
1999). While we do not deny the potential merits of such proposals, we would 
like to highlight one particular problem: When actions become endogenous 
to prices, the connection between prices and actions may become fully circu-
lar: Prices reflect rationally expected actions and, at the same time, also trigger 
those very actions.
From a supervisory perspective, we can call this potential circularity of prices 
and actions the endogeneity dilemma. Supervisors face a dilemma, as the active 
use of market prices for supervisory action may in fact destroy their informational 
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content by preventing the existence of an equilibrium (see box below, Example 1). 
It might seem that the endogeneity dilemma is the end to the idea of market data 
based supervisory action. However, this is not the case. There are two factors, one 
theoretical and one practical, that serve to ‘soften’ the endogeneity dilemma.
Example 1: A Potential Paradox
In the following example, the two-way endogeneity of prices and supervisory actions destroys 
the information content of market prices.
The supervisory authority announces a subordinated debt policy. Under this policy, a bank 
is obliged to issue equity once the yield spread on its subordinated debt hits 3 percent. This 
policy is both credible and common knowledge.30
If the bank is always successful in raising the required capital, subordinated debt holders can 
never lose any money. Knowing this, they would never sell their debt at the discount implied 
by a 3 percent yield spread. The spread thus would never rise to 3 percent in the first place, 
and the supervisor would never require the equity issue! But, if supervisors never intervene the 
spread should hit the 3 percent threshold, forcing the supervisor to intervene. Thus neither 
intervention nor non-intervention are equilibrium strategies.
Example 2: An Equilibrium Outcome
In the following example the supervisor has an equilibrium strategy, even though prices and 
actions mutually depend on each other.
The supervisor, who only intervenes at discrete intervals (once a year, say) requires recapitali-
zation whenever a bank’s spread is found to exceed 3 percent. There is an equal probability of 
either recapitalization succeeding and bringing the spread down to the 3 percent threshold, or 
failing, leaving the spread unchanged. Again, all of this is common knowledge.
Assume a bank has an insolvency risk that would require a spread of 5 percent. The super-
visor thus would intervene and require that the bank recapitalize. Success and failure being 
equally likely, the equilibrium spread would be the mean between 3 percent (success) and 5 
percent (failure). There is thus an equilibrium at a spread of 4 percent. Note, however, that 
in this example the equilibrium only exists because the intervention of the supervisor is not 
always successful.31
The theoretical reason is that an equilibrium price may still exist, even if supervi-
sors tie their actions to market prices. We present an example in which the pres-
ence of a random element supports an equilibrium (see box above, Example 2).
30 A policy is common knowledge if everybody knows that policy, everybody knows that every-
body knows that policy, everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows that 
policy, and so on ad infinitum.
31 Note also, that prices remain informative despite the endogeneity dilemma. Observing a spread 
of 4 percent, with the commonly known success probability of 50 percent, a supervisor can 
infer that in the absence of intervention a spread of 5 percent would be required.
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The practical way around the endogeneity problem is to adopt an appropriate 
design for both bank securities and supervisory interventions. The problem arises 
because the prices of bank securities respond to supervisory interventions (and 
may, in turn, serve as a trigger for these interventions). To eliminate the problem, 
the supervisor needs to find a bank security that is sensitive to the bank’s condi-
tion, but not sensitive to supervisory intervention. Typical candidates are shares 
or subordinated debt. If supervisors can save a troubled bank without bailing 
out shareholders or the holders of subordinated debt, the prices of these secu-
rities will provide an undistorted picture of the bank’s true condition. Conse-
quently, the endogeneity paradox does not arise, even if intervention is triggered 
by movements in share prices or by an increase in the subordinated debt spread. 
Generally speaking, asset prices remain informative if the supervisor is known 
(and able) to intervene in a manner that allocates the losses a bank has already 
incurred to the holders of the individual assets. Supervisory intervention is then 
‘price neutral’ as far as these assets are concerned.
Although Swiss supervisors do not tie actions to security prices, the endog-
eneity problem has been serious for a number of banks, at least in the past. With 
the state guarantee for cantonal banks and ‘too-big-to-fail’ expectations, prices 
for bank debt often reflected policy responses (government bailout) rather than 
bank risk profiles. Prospects for intervening without any impact on prices are 
somewhat better under the new bank insolvency regulations (section 11, Swiss 
Banking Act; effective July 1, 2004). The SFBC, in the course of a mandatory 
restructuring, has the right to cut into the claims of the holders of equity, sub-
ordinated debt or other unsecured (third-class) debt. As far as Swiss law applies, 
rescuing a bank as an ongoing concern thus does not imply a bailout of sharehold-
ers and creditors. These are at risk, even if a bank is rescued. This safeguards the 
information content of market prices for equity and debt and permits their use 
as risk indicators or even as triggers for supervisory action. However, the prob-
lem will remain for the great majority of cantonal banks that only issue securi-
ties protected by state guarantee.
5.1.4 The Pressure of Market Data
A final important characteristic of market data is that they are publicly observa-
ble. Present and past stock prices, for instance, can be checked by anybody, either 
in the newspaper or on the website of a stock exchange; credit derivative prices 
are available from specialized suppliers of financial data like Bloomberg. Even if 
hardly anybody reads all the prices all the time, they are, in principle, available 
to any interested party. Market data thus are common knowledge.
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The public nature of market data creates an incentive for supervisors to ‘do 
something’ after significant movements in such prices. It seems reasonable to 
assume that a supervisory authority, even if independent, is in some form penal-
ized, if (i) a bank fails, and (ii) there is sufficient evidence that the existence of 
a problem was known to the authority ahead of the failure. The penalty may 
include public criticism, loss of independence, changes in management or even 
lawsuits and fines.32 Publicly observable market data, an increase in a bank’s 
debt spread, for instance, may be regarded as evidence that the authority knew 
or should have known that a problem existed. A supervisory authority thus runs 
a higher risk of being penalized for delayed intervention in the case of a bank 
that has outstanding traded instruments than it would in the case of a bank for 
which no market information exists.
This may have beneficial or adverse effects. If a supervisory agency strongly 
dislikes intervention, the pressure of market prices is likely to be beneficial. As 
a source of supervisory discipline, this counteracts the tendency towards regula-
tory forbearance.
If, however, a supervisory agency has no bias towards forbearance, market 
price pressure is likely to go too far. It is well-known that the common knowl-
edge character of public information may distort decisions (M and S, 
2002): Public information is given an excessive weight, as compared to private 
information. Supervisors fearing allegations of forbearance have an incentive to 
react to price movements, even though they regard these as non-informative. In 
this case, the existence of market prices will reduce rather than improve the qual-
ity of supervisory decisions.
Over time, the latter effect – pressure for excessive intervention – is likely to 
become more important, especially in those countries with a strong tendency 
for prompt corrective action. More and more securities or contracts sensitive to 
the condition of banks are traded. Markets are increasingly used as forecasting 
devices in many areas. Public awareness of market data on bank solvency is thus 
likely to increase. This may create pressure on the authorities to ‘do something’ 
when market prices flag a potential problem at a bank, even in situations when 
supervisory information clearly suggests that the bank is sound.
32 For instance, the governments of the cantons Vaud and Geneva sued the SFBC in relation to 
the huge losses incurred by their cantonal banks, arguing that the Swiss supervisor did not 
properly supervise the two institutions. The Bank of England faced a similar suit – which was 
dropped in 2005 – by representatives of BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International), 
a bank that failed in 1991.
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6. Conclusions on the Use of Market Data by Financial Authorities
The above analysis leads to a number of conclusions. Regarding the information 
content of market prices we find that:
– Market data are an important source of information on individual banks’ 
financial health and on financial stability, for both the supervisory authority 
and the lender of last resort. Market information and supervisory information 
are complementary: Market prices often represent information not yet known 
to supervisors. At the same time, confidential supervisory information is not 
always reflected in market prices.
– Market data cannot provide supervisory authorities with all the information 
they would find useful. Market data give some indication of expected losses 
or the probability of failure. However, they say little about the potential causes 
of an observed increase in the probability of failure, and even less about the 
appropriate cure.
– Market data never reflect economic fundamentals per se. They rather tend to 
reflect investor beliefs about fundamentals or, in some episodes, beliefs about 
other market participants’ beliefs. Thus, market prices may not always reflect 
investors’ true perceptions of the probability of a bank failure.
– Economists have not yet explored the functional association of various sol-
vency and risk indicators in any great detail. Given the complementary role of 
individual indicators and their respective advantages and drawbacks, a better 
understanding of their joint information content would be highly desirable.
– The information content of market prices is endogenous, i.e., it depends on 
their supervisory use. Market prices reflect a bank’s condition after expected 
supervisory intervention. Prices for bank debt and equity are thus most inform-
ative if supervisory actions do not exonerate the holders of such assets from 
losses that the bank incurred prior to supervisory intervention.
– The public nature of market data may create some pressure for the supervisory 
authority to react. Supervisors may thus tend to give market information more 
weight than they believe would be appropriate.
Regarding the future use of market prices by the Swiss authorities we find that:
– Market data exist for a minority of Swiss banks, but for a major share of the 
banking system. The best data exist for the two big banks, which are pivotal 
for the functioning and stability of the system.
– In Switzerland, except for the big banks, supervisory data collected directly 
from the banks or in the course of on-site examinations traditionally play a 
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minor role, as compared to auditors’ reports. Market information on cantonal 
banks, the second most relevant domestic banking group, and a number of 
other relatively important banks is thus potentially valuable for the bank super-
visor, the SFBC. Unfortunately, data on cantonal banks are partially distorted 
by state guarantee.
– Market prices send valuable signals to other authorities, like the SNB, which does 
not have direct access to all confidential information available to the SFBC.
– As in the past, in the foreseeable future the Swiss authorities are likely to use 
market information as a complement to other sources of intelligence. Such use 
may even be explicit, as in the case of the SNB systemic stress index. How-
ever, we do not expect an explicit use of market data for rule-based supervisory 
intervention.
Given the increasing complexity of large internationally active banks, we expect 
that financial authorities and other observers will become more and more inter-
ested in market data. Market information is a promising source of supervisory 
intelligence and a potential basis for supervisory action. At the same time, the 
special informational characteristics of market data, their endogeneity in particu-
lar, hint at some potential pitfalls with respect to their unreflected use. Hence, for 
supervisors, market information is a bit like an oracle: It offers valuable insights 
to the careful listener, but leads the rash interpreter astray. We hope that further 
research and practical experience will clarify some of the outstanding issues.
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SUMMARY
Market data, such as bond spreads or equity price volatility, are a complemen-
tary source to bank supervisory information. In Switzerland, meaningful market 
data are available for a number of banks which constitute a major part of the 
banking system. Notwithstanding some limitations (biases due to state guaran-
tee for cantonal banks and potential ‘too-big-to-fail’ expectations for big banks) 
these market data are likely to play a supervisory role in the future. However, 
once the market expects supervisors to react to market data, these data become 
endogenous. This may jeopardize the very potential of market data to serve as 
policy guides.
